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innovations / fall 2008 energy and security. In the short term, it demanded unusual sacrifices from ordinary Americans. The embargo's longest lasting effect, however, was to force U.S. policymakers to accept that the energy issue had irrevocably moved from the domestic to the national security sphere. This realization ensured that the United States would have to maintain an active military and diplomatic presence in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
For the American public the embargo enforced unpleasant, but endurable, deprivations. President Nixon attempted to enforce energy conservation with new measures, ranging from a 55 mph national speed limit to a prohibition on outdoor Christmas lights. 3 Perhaps nothing was more emblematic of the embargo's effect, though, than raised prices at the gas station. By December 1973, the price of Arabian light oil, the recognized base standard, was 266% greater than it had been one year earlier. This increase was passed along to consumers at the pump. Gasoline prices for the first part of 1974 were projected to be 18 percent higher than those recorded one year earlier. 4 The price increases of 1973-1974 were to some degree independent of the embargo. Arab oil powers cut production and stopped exports to selected countries with the aim of leveraging their power to change U.S. policy toward Israel. The price increases, in contrast, drew broad support from OPEC, even from countries like Iran, which continued to supply the United States with oil. However, the price hikes occurred simultaneously with the start of the embargo, and the limited supply left the U.S. no choice but to pay what suppliers asked.
Although the negative repercussions of the embargo were limited, the conser-
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The 1973 embargo solidified and enhanced the initial connection between energy and security. In the short term, it demanded unusual sacrifices from ordinary Americans. The embargo's longest lasting effect, however, was to force U.S. policymakers to accept that the energy issue had irrevocably moved from the domestic to the national security sphere. This realization ensured that the United States would have to maintain an active military and diplomatic presence in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
vation measures and increased gas prices it prompted amounted to a new experience for ordinary Americans. Prompted by the embargo, Nixon and his successors asked citizens to sacrifice for the good of the country as a whole, something that had occurred in times of war, but was previously unknown in a peacetime economic crisis. While the embargo did affect the lives of individual Americans, it had a more lasting impact on national energy policy. In their successful coordination of the embargo, Arab producers demonstrated the susceptibility of the U.S. economy to the decisions of foreign leaders. Although this crisis was by no means debilitating, the U.S. reliance on foreign oil continued to grow, and what was once done could be repeated when the need for Arab oil was more pronounced. By alerting U.S. leaders to the country's dangerous growing dependence, America's first energy crisis ensured that a reliable supply of black gold would henceforth be not only an economic, but also a national security imperative.
Although Richard Nixon called for energy independence, his successors pursued it with domestic policies that institutionalized the issue's new strategic importance. President Gerald Ford devoted a large section of his 1975 State of the Union speech to addressing energy dependency and called for expanded American production, including new drilling in Alaska. One of his most significant contributions was the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This emergency stockpile of oil was a physical insurance policy against future supply disruptions, and a sign of how thoroughly the need for reliable energy had become a part of the U.S.'s conception of its own security.
When Ford announced his ambitious agenda for new energy development, he drew on a military analogy to inspire American response. He remarked that, "In another crisis-the one in 1942-President Franklin D. Roosevelt said this country would build 60,000 military aircraft. By 1943, production in that program had reached 125,000 aircraft annually. They did it then. We can do it now." 5 The SPR was a direct consequence of this new security-oriented energy policy. By labeling the stockpile a strategic reserve, the Ford administration explicitly evoked national defense. Although the word can have non-military connotations, it historically refers to "materials essential to a country for fighting a war," and derives from the Greek word for "general." 6 President Carter continued the executive branch's focus on energy policy. Like Ford, he did so partly through creating domestic infrastructure. In 1977, he enhanced the country's ability to deal with future crises by centralizing control of scattered initiatives under a cabinet-level Department of Energy. Thus, less than five years after the embargo, U.S. energy policy was overseen by an official of stature equal to the Secretaries of State and Defense-it had attained the status of a primary concern of the state. In fact, Carter called the fight to guarantee American energy independence "the moral equivalent of war." 7 In addition to prompting the reform of domestic infrastructure to better accommodate energy's new role as a national security issue, the embargo spurred the United States to undertake international action to guarantee energy imports, and USSR. Therefore, the influence of geopolitical realities on Kissinger's decision to get involved cannot be discounted. However, it remains true that the first Arab-Israeli conflict to have a marked effect on the American economy and lifestyle, was also the first in which the American government was willing to go abroad to make a concerted effort to achieve peace.
Since the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. has continued active diplomatic and military efforts in the Middle East. A decade after Carter's commitment, the U.S. and coalition troops went to war against Saddam Hussein, driving him out of Kuwait, a country that produced two million barrels of crude oil a day. 9 While President George H. W. Bush portrayed the invasion as an effort to free an occupied people from tyranny, his decision to free Kuwait, rather than pursue the end of other longstanding human rights crisis, suggests that the United States had a significant security interest in ensuring that Saddam Hussein did not control the majority of oil in the region. 10 However, the legacy of the embargo permanently changed the way energy policy was viewed in the United States. From the creation of new domestic initiatives, such as Ford's SPR to developments in U.S. foreign policy, such as the Carter Doctrine, energy policy after the embargo was inseparable from the effort to guarantee the security of the United States.
America's oil problem has changed character in the 35 years since the embargo. The technology of conservation and the development of promising non-petroleum energy sources have created a realistic expectation that the U.S. can reduce its addiction to foreign oil. However, the Middle East is as volatile, or perhaps more so, than it was in 1973, and the increasing prominence of the threat from Islamic innovations / fall 2008 33 U.S. alternative energy technology
is not yet sufficient to bridge the gap that decreased foreign oil would leave, and demand for petroleum is likely to continue to grow in the developing world, providing new markets and customers. As long as this situation exists, U.S. energy policy is unlikely to shed the national security mantle it acquired in 1973, and U.S. diplomats and soldiers will continue to be called to serve their country in the Middle East.
